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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

AUSTIN RICE,
Pla.intiff a.nd

A pvp-ellarnt,
vs.
ERMA RICE, Executrix and Trustee, In
the matter of the Esitate of David L.
Rice, Deceased,

Case No.
'7268

De f endwnt and
Respondent.

REP·LY BRIEF O·F PLAINTIF·F AND:

APPEL~LAN·T

Defendant's hrief discloses anew the reasons for this
needless and unduly protracted litigation. She misstates
the will. She misstates our position. :Sh·e cites cases
and legal principles that are not involved and never have
been involved in this litigation, except as they have arisen
by the success of opposing counsel in inducing the lower
court to commit ·error. She attempts to avoid the real
issues involved, and to lay the resulting confusion on
our doorstep.
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The plaintiff's position from the filing of the first
petition, (R. 6'5), until the present moment has been
clear and easy to unders1tand. It has not changed at
alt It is succinctly stated in fu,e quotation given by us
In our former brief, pages 78 and 79, as follows:
''The genera~ rule is that the failure to perform the duty to make disclosures which rests
upon one because of a trust or confidential relation constitutes fraud sufficient for a court of
equity :to relieve against the judgment. This
conclusion could be based upon one of two
theories, nam·ely, that the fraud involved is of
an extrinsic nature, or that the fact that the guilty
party is a fiduciary makes an exception to the
· rule requiring the fraud to be extrinsic. J\1ost
courts simply declare the rule without discussing
the kind of fraud involved.'' 31 Am. Jur. Sec.
67 4, page 241.
From the beginning defendant has assum·ed that
David Rice devised to his son Austin ~27 acres of land,
and that it was her prerogative to determine which 27
acres Aus'tin should r·eceive. 'She has, also, assumed
that she could depriv-e Austin of any water because the
will made no mention of water in connection with the
land devised.
At the very beginning of her brief, in the second
sentence, appears the erroneous and indefensible position assumed by the executrix throughout this matter.
That sentence says : ''By said decree, A us tin Rice, a ppellant, was awarded as his full distributiv~e share of his
father's estate 'approximately 27 acres in ·Section 31,
1
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Township 3 North, Range 1 East, 'Salt Lake Meridian,
no'v occupied by him'.'' Tha t statement of the defendant discloses again her de~iherate intention to misread
the will. The will did not make a devis-e to Austin Rice
in the language quoted hy the defendant in her brief.
The will said: (R. 13) "I give and bequeath to my son
Austin Rice the land, ap·p.roximately 27 acres in S·ection
31, Township 3 N·orth, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian,
now occupied by him.'' The will grammatically arranged
says: ''I give and bequeath to my son Austin Rice
the land now occupied by him, ap·proximately 27 acres
in Section 31, Township· 3 North, Range 1 East, Salt
Lake Meridian.'' The wi1l did not say: ''I gi¥e and
bequeath Austin Rice approximately 27 acres, now occupied by him.'' The will said: ''I give and bequeath to
my son Austin Rice the Zand now occupied by him.'' IThe
positive unequivocal language in 1the will is that Austin
was to hav;e the land now occupied by him. The words
"appiroximately 27 acres" are by. their own terms a
mere approximation, and expressly indicate that the
testator did not know exactly how much land Austin
occupied.
1

In the previous appeal of this case we discussed tthjs
question (P. 24, 25 Reply Brief) and called this court's
attention to the well known rules of construction; that
the certain prevails over the uncertain; thwt definite
language prevails over indefinite language, and that
if Austin Rice occupied the land upon which his barn
and corral are located, it was improper for the defendant
to attem}lrt to deprive him of this land, and it was imSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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proper for her to leave it out of her petition for distribution. While this court did not ·expressly single out this
particular phase of the l~tigation for comment and elucidation, this court did by reversing the case sustain our
position upon this point. It was not the prerogative of
the defendant to say that her fa;ther gave Austin Rice
27 acres of land and that she could select the 27 acres
which in her judgment he should receive. And when,
in her p·etition for distribution, she told the court that
the land ·described therein was that which Austin had
been devis·ed by the will, she told the court that which
was not true, if in fact Austin occupied the land upon
which the barn and corral are located. By her opening
statement in her brief she again makes clear by the misquotation of 1the will that her acts were deliberate and
intentional, and that she intended to deprive Austin
of the land occupied by him because there is no conflict
whatever in the record that he occupied the barn and the
corra~ p·roperty.
In her p~tition for distribution she
didn't e¥en select 27 acres. She selected what she alleged was ·27 acres, and the fact that it does not amount
to 27 acres she ignores and has ignored throughout this
caS'e. The land awarded to Austin by the decree of dis'trihution, as we have pointed out heretofore in our former brief, is 25 plus acres. Defendant certainly didn't
advise the court that Austin occupied the barn and the
corral property, and from her own lips we know that she
intended to deprive him of this land whether he occupied
it or not. In none of her briefs does she make any pre'tense of disputing that Austin occupied the barn and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~property.

the corral

The testimony on that point

IS

over,vhehning and 'vithout dispute.
On page 2 of her brief the defendant misstates the
plaintiff's position in her subdivisions (a), (b) and (c).
Instead of repeating defendant's statement of our p-osition may we again call attention as we have done here~
tofore on numerous occasions throughout our briefs to
the facts as they ,exist in this record. We have always
from the beginning taken the position that an executrix
occupies a fiduciary relationship to the heirs. We have
taken the further p-osition that the executrix is an officer of the court, and by virtue of her position and
especial1y in this dual capacity as a fiduciary and as an
officer of the eourt both the heirs and the court have the
right to rely upon her implicitely and without question.
Neither the heirs nor the court were under any obligation or duty \to question her actions. We have taken
the position from the beginning that David L. Rice devised to his son, Austin, the farm Austin occupied; that
all appurtenant water was devised with the farm, and
thrut Austin was entitled to such an award from the
court in the decree of distribution. In our first petition, (R. 65), we called the court's attention to the fact
that the pe tition f-or distribution was not true; that land
occupied by Austin had been omitted from the petition;
that the executrix was attemp~ting by her actions to deprive the plaintiff even of water appurtenant to the decreed land, and we asked the court which still had juris1

diction of the executrix since the estate was not closed
and also had jurisdiction of the executrix as a testaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mentary trustee 1to correct the errors in the decree of
distrrbution which had occurr·ed by the intentional conduct of the executrix. 'The court erroneous~y sustained
the demurrer to this petition, although i't stated a cause
of action under all the authorities which we cited in our
brief in this app·eal and which we will not now repeat.
In an attempt to meet what we guess·ed was the -court's
objection to the petition we alleged additional matters
which we believed could be established. We filed an
amended p·etition, but we never abandoned our first
theory. We res'tated it and have maintained it consistently and constantly from the beginning of this
case to the pr·esent moment. We have ahvays taken
the position that the defendant in her capacity as an
executrix was a trustee; that the pro.perty in her hands
was trust property; that the beneficiaries of the trust are
the heirs and beneficiaries of the estate, ( P. 8 of our
brief in case No. 7029 in this court). We took the position th·en, and we do now that she was sti~l under the
jurisdiction of the court, and that because of her fiduciary capacity the court could correct any errors committed hy her in the administration of her trust which
adversely affected the heirs and deprived them of the
rights she was bound to :protect, (P. 9 of the aforesaid
brief). We took the position then, and we take the
position no_w that because of her fiduciary relationship
any fraud committed by her whe1ther intentional pr
unintentional, whether it be -called intrinsic or extrinsic,
could be corrected, and that. the right to correct it was
not dependent up·on any diligence exercis·ed by the heirs
1

1

1
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who had a right to rely upon her. We cited to this
court in our first brief the case of Hazel-Atlas Glass
Company vs. H.artford-Empli.re Cornp1any, 322 U.S. 238,
88 L. Ed. 1250, 'vherein the court had under consideration a judgment procured by fraud many years earlier,
and \vhich apparently did not even involve ~the vita~ fiduciary question involved in this case. In that case the
court pointed out that equitable relief from a fraudulent
judgment is not a statutory creation, and is no1t eontrolled by statutes, nor by the laches of the defrauded
party, (although in the present case there is no question
of laches), hut is a judicially devised remedy to free
the court from the fraud practiced upon it. The fact
that the judgment in that case had become final and
not appealable was not controlling. The court said:
''But even if Hazel did not exercis·e the highest degree of diligence Hartford's fraud cannot
be condoned for that reason alone. This matter
does not concern only private parties. * * * Furthermore, tamp·ering with the administration of
justice in the manner indisputab1y shown here
involves far more than an injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set
up to protect and safeguard the public, insltitutions in which fraud cannot complacently he tolerated consistently with the good order of society.
Surely it carunot be that lpvreser·vation of the in'tieg.rity of the judicial P'~ocess mJUst alw~ays wait
upon the dinigence of li.tig1ants. The public welfare dem.and.s that the agencies ·of public justice
be not so impotent that they must alw1a ys be mute
and helpless victims of d.e:cept~on and ftiwud. ''
(page 246 U.S. Reports, 1256 of L_. Ed.) (Italics
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added) (P. 13 and 14 of our brief In case No.
7029 in this cour t).
1

We amended our petition in an attempt to satisfy
the tria~ court, hut we never abandoned the original
theory upon which this case was brought. We have always taken the position that water appurtenant to the
land that was actually decreed went with it even though
not mentioned in the decree of distribution, and this
without consideration of the question of fraud. Inasmuch as it was necessary to raise this question because
of the barn and corral properit~ not included in the decree of distribution we pointed out then as we do now
that" the same intentions that actuated the executrix with
reference to the wa ter, actuated her with reference to
the omitted land, and since we asked the court to amend
the decree to include the omitted land, we also asked the
court to make the decree certain with reference to the
water right-not because the water had not already
passed, but because the ,executrix was disputing our
right to it, and justifying her aC!tions hy the argument
that it wasn't sp ecifically mentioned in the decree of
distribution. 'To set this argument and controversy at
rest we asked the court to amend the decree of distribution. The court still had the entire matter before it.
There was no question then, and there is no question
now of any rights of innocent third parties. ·Ther~e is
no question of depriving any one of anything to which
he is ·entitled, but we merely asked that the plaintiff be
given what his father devised to him, and that the erroneous decree of distribution which awarded his prop1

1

1

1
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erty to the other heirs be corrected. The defendant and
the other heirs ,,~ere not entit'led to plaintiff's water
and 'vere not entitled to plaintiff's land, and the determined effort of the defendant from the beginning up
to the present time to secure for herself land and water
to which the plaintiff is entitled when it was her duty
to see he got it, is fraud no matter whaJt argument she
makes as to her good intentions. She is still trying to
get the plaintiff's "\Vater and the plaintiff's land. She
was not an adversary party in any of these p·roceedings
prior to the decree of distribution. She was a fiduciary.
She was the rep,resentative of the plaintiff. H·er counsel was his counsel, and when, in her petition for distribution she by her counsel stated to the court that she
was describing al~ that plaintiff was enti~tled to under
the will, she made thos,e assertions as the rep.resentative of the plaintiff. When the court acted upon those
representations, if they were untrue, the court was deceived, and the plaintiff's fraud was extrinsic under all
the authorities.
1

Assume that the defendant had said to the plaintiff: ''Your father didn 'it ~eave you anything under the
will,'' and the plaintiff had relied upon her assertion
and gone his way, and later after the decree of distribution had become final had discovered that there was a
devise to him. Under defendant's theory she could say:
''You had no right to rely on me, and you are out, and
I am in. I get what shou'ld have gone to you, and you
1

are powerless to make me give it up." Fortunately,
that is not the law. When the defendant accepted the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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appointment as an executrix, she then became charged
with the duty of :properly repres·enting the plaintiff, and
he had the right to rely upon her. 'Suppose the defendant had said to the plain tiff as she claims she did, although the coul'!t has found to the contrary: ''Your
father did not leave you any water and did not leave
you the land across the street,'' and the plaintiff believing her had gone his way. The fact that the decree of
distribution had become final would not prevent the
court from correcting the wrong done by the defendant
in her fiduciary capacity. ·The cases are uniform on
this subject, as we have already pointed out. Later we
sha~l also point out how this court is committed to the
same doctrine. Defendant assumes that because the
trial court found that she did not prevent hiin from
attending the hearing on the petition for distribution
that is decisive of this case. It is nothing of the kind.
That is only a minor ·element in this case. The trial
court found, as, of ·course, he must since it is in the
record and can't 'he disputed, that the defendant in her
petition for distribution stated to the court, paragraph
6 of the findings of fact herein:
1

1

"That in paragraph 6 of her petition for t:fle
settlement of her final account and for distribution, said Erma Rice, executrix among other
things set forth :
'6. That by said last will and testamen't said
decedent devised : ·
' (a) * ·* * *
'(b) Unto his son, Austin Rice, as his full
and only distributive share -of said decedent's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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estate the following· described property located
in Farmington, Davis County, State of Utah, to'vit :' " (D·escribing the decreed land without
the barn and corral property and without mention of water appurtenant to the decreed land).
In other words, in this case the trial court sp,ecifically
found thaJt this defendant told the court in the probate
proceedings that that land and only that land without
water was what David Rice devised to his son, Austin.
Later in the findings the court said and found, finding
No. 9, that there " . .as four hours of water appurtenant
to the land. In her testimony, as we pointed out in our
brief in this appeal, the defendant stated that there. was
no water at all appurtenant to the land; that she intended to deprive the plaintiff of the water. She sti~l
insists in her brief herein that there is no water appurtenant. She still intends to deprive him of tfie
water, and yet the trial court in finding No. 11 states :
1

''That the failure of the ·executrix to include
any water rights from Davis Creek as appurtenant to the said 27.71 acres or to have any water
right decreed as appurtenant to said ~and was
not for the purpose or with any intent of attemp'ting to deceive the court or to defraud the petitioner.'"
This finding is directly contrary to finding No. '6, and
is directly contrary to th·e defendant's own !testimony
at the trial, and to her assertions in h·er brief here.
There isn't a shadow of a doubt that she intentionally
failed to mention the waJter and the barn and corral
prop,erty; that she int~entionally intended to deprive the
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plaintiff of it, and that she still intends to if she can.
In finding of fact No. 6 'the court found that the defendant petitioned the court as therein s-et forth. She did not
cal'l to the court's attention in the p~robate matter the fact
that the will gave to Austin Rice the land he then oCcupied. On the contrary, she herself, said thrut she assumed to tell the court that the land she described was
all that Austin was entitled to without any reference to
the ques~tion of whether or not he occupied it or whether
he occupied other or additional lands. If she did as she
says she did and told Austin that he was getting all that
his father left him, then she to~d him that which was not
true. She, hers·elf, is the witness who said she did this
intentionally and for the purpose of keeping him from
obtaining anything -else.
In this case there is just no question that the defendant intended to keep Austin from getting any water
with his land, and that she intended to keep him from
getting the barn and the corral property. And if she
told him, as she said she did, that that is what his father
left him under the will and nothing more, and he relied
upon her, that is fraud, eall it intrinsic or extrinsic or
what you may, that will he set aside and corrected, and
~particular1y where the matter is still pending in the
court where the deception occurred.
Defendant asserts at page 3 of her brief that the
trial court found that the defendant was not guilty of any
fraudulent misrepresentation of any kind, intrinsic or
extrinsic. It makes no difference what the defendant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
asserts or "~hat statements are made in the findings
w·hen it appears 'Yithout contradiction in the record that
the defendant represented to the court in her petition
for distribution that the land therein ·described without
water was all that Austin was devised under the will.
The lower court here expressly finds that ther·e were
four hours of water appurtenant to the decreed land.
The defendant herself stated that she intended to deprive
Austin of that water, and her brief still insists at page
32 that he is not entitled to it. Having found that there
is water appurtenant to the land, and having found
that the defendant represented to the court that the
land had no water, it is idle to ass·ert that a finding of
no fraud can be sustained.
It is true that the trial court found that the defendant did not prevent the plaintiff from attending the
hearing on the pe:tition for distribution hecaus·e p~laintiff
becam·e confused as to the time when this hearing was
held and said it was in the spring instead
in December. Defendant asserts that there is no proof in the
record to sustain this allegation in the plaintiff's
amended p·eltition. The plaintiff was very clear as to
the event, but not clear as to the time when it occurred.
Be that as it may, and assuming, as we must, that the
trial court's finding on this point is sustained by Erma
Rice's denial, she, here self, t;estified that she told the
plaintiff that under the will he got no water, and he
didn't get the barn and the corrai property. 'The plaintiff was required to go no further. He was ·entitled to
rely upon her. It now develops from the uncontradiclt:ed

or

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
evidence that he did occupy at all times the barn and the
corral :property, and that that land is in Section 31.
The barn and the corral isn't worth anything to anybody else, bu:t to the plaintiff it is an indispensable part
of his farm and always has been, and his father knew
this when the will was drawn. There is not a word in
the will to support defendant's assertion erroneously
admitted by the trial} court that the father said Austin
was to ge:t the land below the road. It is also undisputed
in the record that for several years prior to his death
the father didn't use the harn or corral property at all.
So it is US'eless for defendant to ass·ert, whether the trial
court found i:t or not, that she did not make misrepresentations both to the plaintiff upon which he relied and
also to the court in the pro bate rna tter.
The trial court having found that there was appurtenant water, has found directly against e~ery one
of the defendant's witnesses who testified that there was
no water from Davis Creek used on the Austin Rice
tract. Having found that there was appurtenant water,
of course, ~the appurtenant water passed under the decree of distribution, and it was perfectly proper for the
trial court to define the extent of that water right. It
was improper, however, for the trial eourt to mix .that
issue up with other water rights of David L. Rice and
to try to apportion David L. Rice's 32 hours of water
among a~l of his farms. 'That was not an issue. The
only issue in this case on that point was what wa;ter was
appurtenant to the Austin Rice farm. The defendant
and most of her witnesses said there was none, in spite
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of the fact that some of defendant's "\vitnesses testified that Austin did use the high water. No attemtprt
was made by defendant or her witnesses to show what
part of David L. Rice's 32 hours had been most recently
used on any ;tract. It cannot be determined from this
record what 'vater David Rice used on any other land just
prior to the making of his 'vill or prior to his death, -and
that is the time at 'vhich 've must make the determination
in order to know w·hat "\Vater was appurtenant to any particular land. The court did not believe the def,endant or
her witnesses. Th·e court did believe the. plaintiff and
his witnesses that there was some appurtenant water,
and so found. We submit the court cou'ld have done
nothing else. From David L. Rice himself comes the
most significant bit of evidence in the entire case. In
his application to the State Engineer for the well and
drain on the southeast corner of the Austin Rice :tract
he stated in 1936, as we have pointed out heretofore, that
the wel~ and the drain was merely to supplem·ent his
canyon water. That was before Austin Rice went on
the farm. David L. Rice hadn't abandoned his canyon
water. He was claiming it as late as 1'93'6. In fact, as
the trial court himself significantly remarked at one
point in the case when sustaining defendant's objection
to the conversation between David L. Rice and others
with reference to eem~enting the ditch the entire way:
that, the ditc:P. itself is there~ There is no dispute that
the ditch itself runs to the Austin Rice tract, and in this
country we don't dig ditches to carry non-existent water.
Having found that there was appurtenant water, the
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trial .court was wrong in saying that Erma Rice did not
make any misrepresentations, and having found that
there was appurtenant wa:ter, the trial court was bound
to decr~ee to Austin Rice's farm sufficient water to be of
some good. The very meaning of appurtenant water is
water us·ed on the land to which it is ap:prurtenant and
which is essential to the land in order for it to be productive.
Austin and his wife testified that they hav.e used the
water from Davis Creek for ten hours a week every
week since they were on the farm. That the water from
Davis Creek has been used on the Austin Rice farm
during the entire irrigation s-eason is borne out by every
one of the plaintiff's witnesses. And as to the use during the recent years, McQuiston, both of the Hughes
men and Austin and his wife state that it was sufficient to mature crops on ;th.e 8 to 1'2 acres. Without
the water these acres are useless, and Austin's inheritance is of little vaflue. It is preposterous to believe that
in this country a father would will his son a farm without any waJter, particularly when the land was acquired
with appurtenant water, was inventoried with appurtenant water, and the appurtenant water was still claimed
by the father as late as 1936 in an official document
recorded in the S;tate Engineer's Office. As to the
amount of water, no one disputes Austin and his wife
that the ten hours are essential and necessary, not only
for the 8 to 12 acres of high ground, but also when availab~e

for the hay. Appurtenant water is water tha;t has

been used on land and is necessary for that land, and
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there is not one \Yord in the record to dispute the testimony that the ten hours and the entire ten hours are
needed.
Defendant in her brief criticizes our statement of
the evidence, but fails to point out anything specific.
H·er own analysis emphasizes mainly that each one of
her witnesses stated that the Austin Rice farm is irrigated by drains. The trial court exp·ressly struck this
out of the findings. 'This appears from our ohjection to
the proposed findings, as we have pointed out in our
former brief. The court refused to find that the Aus:tin
Rice tract was irrigated by drains in th·e absurd manner testified to by defendant and her witnesses. On
page 7 of her brief defendant herself points out that her
witness, Roy White, contradicts all of her brothers who
testified that never was any water used from Davis
Creek through the White Ditch on the Austin Rice farm.
Roy White said that David L. Rice· took water through
the ditch up to 1919. So we may ignor~e, as the trial
court did, every ·witness who stated that no water was
used from the Davis ·Creek on the Austin Rice tract, and
we may ignore, as the trial court did, every witness who
said Austin's farm was watered by drains.
On page 8 of her brief defendant says that Mrs.
Austin Rice could only testify as to a period subsequent
to 1937. Whoever wrote this assertion doesn't know
what the record shows. Annie Rice testified that she
had been familiar with this land al~ her life, and particularly familiar with i;t ever since her marriage in
1930 or thereabouts. Defendant also makes the asserSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
tion on page 8 of her brief that it is impossible to believe
Mrs. Annie Rice because she stated that she helped her
husband irrigate and also attended to rearing of her
children during those years. This s1tatement is utterly
inexcusable, and is a purely gratuitous assertion, and
since the defendant has indulged in the gratuity, may "\ve
state to the court that we have s-een the defendant's wife
assisting in the irrigation and have seen her caring for
her children herse'lf and without any assistance ·except
as the children themselves gav·e it to her. · ·The plaintiff's wif·e has the true pioneer instincte ·of assisting her
husband regardless of his poverty, and in spite of the
fact ;that she has other duties which would overwhehn
an ordinary woman. This slur on plaintiff's wife by
defendant who must know, if she knows anything, of the
hardships and trials that that family has undergone and
of their courageous and single-handed battle is utterly
malevolent.
Again on page 8 of h·er 'brief defendant incorrectly
summarizes the testimony of Irvin Hughes to the effect
that he said he had never seen wat~er diverted from the
White Ditch on the Austin Rice ~and. At pages ·26 and
27 of our former brief we gave the correct statement of
Irvin Hughes' testimony. Irvin Hughes stated that he
had seien Austin use the water on his land during the
last few years since he has been living on the property,
and that he used it all summer and also for early crops;
that he used. the water after it was on shares; that
about thre.e years ago Austin got scared by a rattlesnake
when going up the ditch; that that was in July after
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the 'vater had gone on shares. In fact, he said Austin
had flooded their land out at one tin1e by letting the ditch
get clogged; that was about five years ago. He also
said that there was no other place for David L. Rice to
get 'vater except from the Davis Creek through the
\Vhite Ditch. The same criticism applies to defendant's
analysis of David R. Lund's testimony which we recited at pages 27 and 28 of our former bri~ef. D;efendant criticizes p~aintiff's witness, McQuiston. She well
could be apprehensive of his testimony, but her attempt
to minimize its importance is futile. His testimony as
we have detailed it at pages 29 and 30 of our brief
positively, clearly and without contradiction establishes
not only that Austin used the water during the irrigation season, but that his turn was at night, as Austin has
testified.
The trial court should have found that the ten hours
of water were appurtenant to the land because the ten
hours of water have been used and are necessary. Appurtenant water, our statute declares, as we have called
to the attention of this court in our former brief at page
54, :Sec. 100-1-11, U.C.A. 1943, passes with ;the p~arcel of
land on which the right was exercised next preeeding the
time of the execution of any conveyance thereof. There
is nobody who disputes Austin and his wife as to the
ten hours of water being used ''next preceding the time
of the execution of any conveyance ;thereof,'' except defendant and her witnesses whom the court refus·ed to
believe. Defendant asks why wou~d David Rive use onethird of his water to irrigate 8 or 9 acres through a ditch
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that won't hold water until it was cemented in 1934, when
he had upwards of 70 acres· of orchard and other lands.
The answer to this query is simple. In the first place,
there ar.e more than 8 acres needing irrigation. During
the freshet season the en tire tract is irrigated with all
the water it can get, and during the irrigation season
as long as the water lasts in sufficient quantity the ten
hours is us~ed on all ithe farm, and it is only when it
dwindles that the ten hours are a;pplied exclusively to
the high [and which is described variously as from 8 to
12 acres. In the s·econd place, none of the early irrigation ditches in this state carried water efficiently and
none of the ditches in this strut:e were impervious. It has
been a constant battle to get irrigation ditches made
impervious so that they would carry water. The query
is: why did they cement the White D1tch at all and put
a culvert under the road to carry it to the Austin Rice
farm if it was never used for the Austin Rice farm, and
why was David Rice trying to ~et it cemented clear to
his place if he had abandoned :the water, and why in
1936 did he assert to the State Engineer that he wanted
a well to supplement his canyon water if he had no
canyon water. In the third place, there isn't any evidence at all in this record that David L. Rice used jus t
prior to his death any of his water on his orchards, or
where he used it. 'That question was not an issue in this
case. Austin Rice in support of his motion for new trial
makes affidavit of facts that wou~d have been produced
had i:t been an issue as to what other farms of David L.
Rice used water. We were concerned only with what
1
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water "~as appurtenant to the Austin Rice farm, and
the record is undisputed that if there is an ap1purtenant
water right, 'vhich the court found there was, that appurtenant \Yater right is ten hours.
Defendant brushes off the barn and corral property
with a paragraph "\Vhich says nothing. There was no
dispute in the evidence as to this land, and when the
trial count found that . .c\ustin didn't occupy the land,
he found in the face of the uncontradicted evidence. We
pointed out in our former brief the value of th!e various
bequests and devises under the David L. Rice will. We
did this in order for this court to see how little value
there would be to the Aus:tin Rice inheritance under defendant's theory, and also to point out to this court how
little justification there is for defendant trying to deprive him of the ham and corral proper;ty when its
value is so insignificant to anyone hut him. Defendant
asks why she woUld have any motiv;e in doing what she
has done. The reason is clear to us that becaus~e 2.7
acres were mentioned in the will, she and her counsel
decided that they would select the 27 acres, which in
reality are only 25 acres, that Aus:tin should get and
would leave out his barn and corral, and that because
the will didn't mention any water they would take that
away from him too. In her petition for distribution
defendant described every <tract as having a'ppurtenant
water where the inventory showed it had appurtenant
water ~except the Austin Rice tract. Why did she leave
him

out~

We submit she left him out because she

thought tha;t because the wi~l didn't say water she could
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deprive him of any water, and she has stubhornly and
p~ersistently, and still does in her present hrief, tried to
sustain her position. If that doesn't constitute misrepresentation and fraud, we confess we do not know
what does.
1

THE QUES:TION

~OF

E·XTRIN'STC FRAUD

We have already discussed in our former brief and
her·etofore in this reply the doctrine that the misrepresentations of one acting in a fiduciary capacity are extrinsic fraud, although, as pointed out by the authorities,
most of the eourts do not trouble to attempt to label the
fraud, and some of them in discussing the question state
that if the fraud of the fiduciary could be characterized
as intrinsic, the effect of it will be overcome as an exception to the extrinsic fraud rule. However, in view
of the fact :that defendant has devoted most of her brief
to a discussion of extrinsic and intrinsic fraud (pages
10 to 25 inclusive) and asserts that it is immaterial in
this ease whether there was appurtenant water to the
Austin Rice 1tract or whether or not Austin occupied the
barn and the corral property and that whether Erma
Rice was under any duty to ca'll these facts to the court's
attention ''is all beside the real question for determination on :this appeal,'' page 10. Additional comment
seems in order. In other words, since the defendant and
her counse1 now baldly state that it is immaterial to the
real question in this cas·e whether or not she was guilty
of fraud, we will hriefly notice her argument.
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As we understand her contention, it is now the same
as it was at the hearing on the first demurrer to the first
petition of the plaintiff. Stated in our language, it is
this, that because she 'vaited until the decree of distribution had beco1ne fina1 before she raised any of these questions against Austin, he cannot now correct th·e wrong
done him. The record is quite clear that Erma never
attempted to interfere with Austin's use of the barn
and corral property or the water until after the decree
of distribution became final, and she thought it was
too late for Austin to do anything a:hout it. There is
no question whatever that until this present hearing
Austin's rights 'vere never presented to any court. No
court determined what water he was en1titled to nor
whether or not he was entitled to the barn and corral
property. Those qu·estions w·ere never p~resented. Why~
Because Erma Rice never called them to the court's attention. She intended then and intends now to deprive
Austin of both the water and the land. Never has he had
his day in court until now, and that was solely because of
the conduct of the def·endant. He claims it was because
she never disclosed her true intentions but had a~ways
told him ~that she would s·ee that he got all that he· was
entitled to under his father's will. She claims that she
told him that under the will he didn't get any water
or the barn and corral property. Under either state of
facts ~there is ·extrinsic fraud under all the authorities.
Defendant assumes that because the trial court found
that she did not do anything to prevent Austin from
attending the hearing on the petition for dis1tribution
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that Austin has no -cause of action. It was never our
theory that we were entitled to relief only upon the
narrow ground that she :told him he didn't need to remain at the hearing of the petition for distribution. He
says she did do that, and she says she didn't. 'The trial
court did not sustain Austin's position on this point, but
the defendant can't deny that the petition for distribution was false, and she intended it to he false, and if, as
she says she told Austin he didn't get the water or the
barn and corral property under the will, that was false,
and it was. extrinsic fraud if he relied upon her as he
had a right to do and as a result of her conduct and his
reliance he loses to her gain.
Counsel says at page 13 of def·endant's bri·ef that
the only al legation of extrinsic fraud is that ~the defendant by her ·conduct induced Austin not to remain f.or
the hearing on the petition for distribution. That is
a most inconsequential part of Austin's case. Even if
he had remained, he wouldn't have known any more than
he did by going away. He wouldn't have lmown without
an independent examination of the eounty records
whether the property described therein contained the
barn and the -corral or not. Nor would he have known
1

that Erma was contending that appurtenant water did
not accompany the land to be decreed. The crux of this
case is that the will gave Austin the land he now occupies, and that devise carries with it appurtenant water,
and if by her conduct she has p·revented him from s-ecuring the land he ·occupied with the appurtenant water,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
that is extrinsic fraud no matter how she accom1plished
it. Counsel argues that because Austin says the ~event
took place at the courthouse in the spring- time instead of
in December the defendant can go scot free. The tim~e
or the place or the occasion is not the test of extrinsic
fraud, but it is the thing done and relied upon regard~~ess
of when or where it was done that constitutes the fraud.
Counsel cite, as \\"'"e have heretofore cited, the ca:s·e
of W eya1zt vs. Utah Sa.vifn.gs and Trust Company, 54 Utah
181, 182 Pac. 189. That case as we read it is in line with
all the authorities that the fraud of the administratrix
if it occurs during the administration is extrinsic fraud.
Our court in that case points out at page 206 of the
Utah Reports:

''In this case, however, the administratrix,
so far as respondents are concerned, acted directly contrary to and in the very teeth of the duty
imposed upon her by law * * *." "* * * nor did
the W;rongs commlitted by her occur after the
decree of ·distribution, nor when acting in the
capacity lother t'ha.n that of administratrix.''
(Italics added)

In that case there was extrinsic fraud because the administratrix committed her wrongs while in her capacity
as administratrix. It is true that ther·e was actually no
notice to the true heirs of the proceedings, hut that was
not the controlling principle involved in the case. The
principle in the case is the same as that announced by
all the authorities ·except one referred to by defendant
to which we shall hereafter caU attention.

That prin-
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ciple is the one we have repeatedly reiterated, that the
fraud of an administratrix committed in the- consummation of her trust is extrinsic. All of the actionable fraud
of the administratrix in the- Weyant cas·e was committed
by her whil~ she was admi:r:tistratrix, and despite the
fact that the decree of distribution had long since become
final, our court at page 202 of the Utah Reports says:
"We are :presented with a case, therefore,
where the fraud is not only extrinsic, but where
it operated directly upon the -court as well as· upon
the respondents; that is the adminis'tratrix merely
used the court as an instrumentality by means
of which· she gained her end, nam·ely, to acquire
the property belonging to respondents through
legal forms.''
Language could not mor·e aptly describe the exact situation with which we are confronted in the present cast.
·Counsel cites in defendant's brief the case of D1avis
vs. Se:avy, (Wash.) 163 Pac. 35 and quotes from it at
length. That case is exactly ·contrary to the W·eyant
case, and the decision in the Davis vs. Seavy case is contrary to all other jurisdictions we have discovered inc1uding Utah and the California cas-es cited by defendant. 'The Washington case puts a premium upon dishonesty and in effect advises trustees that if they can
successfully conceal their fraud until they have reaped
the fruits of it, the courts will p-rotect them. Such is
not and never has heen the law. In the Weyant case the
administratrix did not disclose to the court the existence
of relevant facts, and by r·eason of her failure to make
1
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these disclosures she secured property that should have
gone to the other heirs. She did· exactly the same thing
as did the executrix in the present cas·e and in the Washingt.on case. Our court said that that was extrinsic
fraud even though it involved false and perjured testimony in the proceeding itself. In the Weyant case our
court cites with approval the case of Benson vs. Anderson, 10 Utah 135 heretofore re'lied upon by us and also
the ·California case of Sohle.r vs. Bohler, ·67 Pac. 282,
likewise heretofore relied upon by us. In the Weyant
case the administratrix's acts,. as the court points out,
occurred during the course of the administration and·
·while she was acting as administratrix, and they, therefore, constitute extrinsic fraud because they p·r~evented
the heirs from receiving what she was in duty hound
to see that they did receive. Her conduct prevented the
heirs from receiving what they were entitled to, and
that was ·extrinsic fraud, even though it involved false
and perjured testimony in the hearing itself. In principle the Weyant case and the present case are identical.
Counsel state at page 23 that the case of Earl vs.
Picken, 113 Fed. ( 2) 150, cited in our brief pages 85-87,
is not the rule in this state. The principles in the case
of Earl vs. Picken are not oniy the rule in this state,
but in every other state with the possible exception of
the one Washington case supra. We will not repeat
what we have heretofore said in our former brief in this
connection. ·Counsel cite two Utah cases, Ande:rson vs.
State, 65 Utah 512, and W~ight vs. Oonst·ruct~ovn Company, 108 Utah 28. In neither case was there any fiduSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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c1ary relationship involved. Both cases involved adversary proceedings. The probate p·roceedings in the
instant case were in no s·ense adversary. In the probate
proceedings both the defendant and her counsel were
our representatives. As a matter of true logic, neither
defendant nor her counsel have any standing whatever in
the present case. They were both our representatives
and ther·e is no adversary except defendant in her pers·onal capacity seeking to avoid the results of the misrepresentation ·of us in the ~probate proceedings. It is
merely begging the question to say that Judge Hendricks would have done the same as he did had he known
all the facts. The presump·tion is that a court wiU do
what is right, and it was the duty of the court had all
the facts heen disclosed to see that Austin Rice received
the land he occupied with the appurtenant water. Defendant again urges that we were negligent and, therefore, she can reap the fruits of her wrongdoing. We
have already sufficiently answered that. The authorities are uniform that we were not under any duty to
scrutinize her acts or conduct, but were entitled to rely
implicitely upon her to re:present us properly.
She alleges ·that if there was any failure to disc~ose
facts, that was intrinsic fraud. Under the doctrine of
the Weyant and all the other cases that is extrinsic fraud,
but regardless of whether it is called extrinsic or intrinsic recovery is allowed because of the fiduciary relationship. Defendant asserts that Judge Cowley declined to
agree with our contention. This is not accurate. Judge
Cowley did agree, contrary to defendant's vehement and
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continued protests, that she had attempted to deprive us
of appurtenant \Yater. That is the main point in the
case. The farm \vithout the water is no good as a farm.
He did not agree that \Ye occupied the barn and corral
property, but in this he is mistaken because the evidence
is without dispute that \ve al\vays occupied it and that
it was an essential part of the farm. Being entitled as
we were to the barn and corral ·property and to the appurtenant w. ater, defendant's attempt to depTive us of
it and her failure to disclose the facts to the probate
court constituted extrinsic fraud, hut call it what you
may it \vas such fraud as can be rectified under all th·e
authorities. Defendant says she honestly presented her
petition for distri'bution on the basis of her understanding, and that she acted in entire good faith. If so, why
did she describe in her petition for distribution appurtenant water in describing all of the tracts that went
to her and leav.e out the appurtenant water in Austin's ~
Why was Austin's the only tract which showed appurtenant water according to the inventories where the appurtenant water was omitted in the rpetition for distribution~ We can only judge her honesty and good faith
by what she did and by her continued and present effort
to keep Austin from acquiring the appurtenant water and
all the land he occupied.
At page 19 of her brief defendant says we have disregarded the theory of our case and entire~y ignored the
only charge of fraud stated in our complaint, and that
we undertake now to base our case on intrinsic fraud.
The stat·ement is entirely inaccurate, as we have already
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shown. Our theory is now as it always has been. Then
on pages 20, ·21 and 22 defendant adverts to the cases
cited by us in our former hrief to show that in each case
the fraud involved was intrinsic. Defendant overlooks
the faet that whether the fraud was intrinsic or extrinsic
the court granted relief from the judgrnent obtained by
such fraud. If the defendant insists on calling the
fraud in thos·e cases intrinsic, which the -courts involved
didn't so label, then she, of cours-e, is obliged to con0ede
that all those cases, because of the fiduciary relationship, a~lowed recovery where the fraud was intrinsic. As
a rna tter of fact, some of the cases call the· fraud ·extrinsic and some of them don't attempt to label it at all.
Extrinsic fraud doesn't consist merely in failing to- give
notice to heirs, hut extrinsic fraud involves any conduct
of the fiduciary which results in loss to the beneficiary,
particularly where the fiduciary benefits. It also occurs. where the fiduciary fails to disclose the facts or
advances erroneous facts as the hasis for the judgm·ent.
Defendant asserts that a~l the cases cited hy us show
deliberate bad faith and intentional fraud. The defendant's conduct in the present case was intentional
and deliberate and still is.
The case of U. 8. vs. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61,
65, 25 L. Ed. 93, is cited by defendant. It was also cited
by us in our former brief and by this court in its decision
heriein in the former case. While that case involved an
adversary proceeding, it is authority for the pro:position
that where one is p·revented from ·exhibiting fully his case
by fraud or deception so that there has never been a real
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contest the fraud is extrinsic. No one can contend that
plaintiff ever had a hearing until this present hearing,
and he didn't have a hearing, either because defendant
said she would protect him, or because she told him
he was not ieft the property that actually was left to
him under the will, and he relied upon her statements as
he had a right to do.
Defendant contends that the decree of distribution
is conclusive construction of the will and cites at pages
26 and 27 two California cases, Go·olde vs. Montgomery,
·51 Pac. 682, and In re Keet's Estate, 91 Pac. (2) 944.
Defendant also cited these cases on the former appeal in
this case. These cases do not sup·port the defendant in
any position involved in this matter. No question of
fraud arose in those cases. However, the court in the
Keet case did say that in spite of a statute p-roviding that
.the administration of a trust must follow the decree of
distribution circumstances could arise that would justify
the court in departing from provisions of the decree of
distribution. The court points out that there is no such
sanctity to a decree of distribution as to make it completely unallterable. What the court held was that there
had not been presented to the court any facts justifying
a change in the terms of the decree of distribution.
The obvious inference is that had there heen such facts
presented a change in the decree of distribution would
have been sustained. In the case at bar we are not
seeking to abrogate 1:he decr;ee of distribution but only to
correct it so that it will speak truly concerning the devise made by the testator. ·The case merely holds that
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the court sitting in probate has no power under the facts
presented to terminate a trust before the time designated
for its termination by the decree of distribution. ·The
Goode case merely holds that the terms of a will cannot be used as evidence to impeach the decree of distribution. No question of fraud arose or was considered in that case, nor was th·ere any fiduciary involved.
On :page 31 of her brief defendant argues that if
David L. Rice did originally acquire any water right
with the decreed ~and, he transferred that to his lands
to the north and abandoned its use on the Austin Rice
tract. David L. Rice didn't so state in his application
to the State Engineer, nor ·did the trial cour:t so find,
nor does the evidence so show. Defendant's entire brief
is a peculiar plea of confession and avoidance. In one
breath she asserts she has done no wrong, and in the
next breath that even if she has she should not be corrected. Not because of any rights of innocent third
persons, but because we didn't distrust her in time to
appeal from the decree of distribution. There is no
law whatever to support any such proposition.
We submit that the trial court having found an appurtenant water right was bound to accept the only evidence ther;e is as to the extent of tha;t right. Having
found an ap:purtenant water right, the only evidence
there is as to what amount of water is necessary to
mature the crops and what amount of water was used,
is that the spring or high water whenever required and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33
available, and the water after it had gone on turns to
the extent of ten hours a week, was necessary on this
land and had been used thereon. There is no dispute
whatever in the record that Austin occupied the barn
and corral property. The decree of the trial court should
be corrected to give the p~aintiff the water prop·erly appurtenant to this land as abov.e indicated and the barn
and the corral property.
Respectfully submitted,

SHIRLEY P. JONES
Attorney f.orr Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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